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Abstract
During the “age of austerity” the UK government has progressively limited free 
health services for “overseas visitors” on the grounds of fairness and frugality. This 
is despite the fact that the cost of the additional bureaucracy required by the new 
system and the public health consequences are expected to exceed the sums saved. 
In this article I explore the interaction between the discourses of austerity and xen-
ophobia as they relate to migrants’ access to healthcare. By examining the avail-
able data and adjudicating various moral arguments, I cast doubt on the claim that 
the current charging regulations are cost-effective and fair. I instead contend that if 
the UK is concerned with running a health service that is economically-sustainable 
and morally-defensible, it is critical that migrants are welcomed, both as staff and 
as patients. I conclude by arguing that xenophobia has precipitated changes to the 
health service which do not qualify as “austerity” in the way that is claimed, but 
rather deliberately produce a “hostile environment” for migrants, despite this very 
likely generating economic losses.
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Introduction
In recent years, the UK government has restricted migrants’ access to the National 
Health Service (NHS), reducing the services which are free, and charging for others. 
It has claimed to have done so for reasons of fairness and frugality, in concert with 
other welfare cuts as part of a programme of austerity over the last decade.
In this article I contend that while changes to migrants’ access to the NHS are 
presented as an austerity measure, they are in fact more likely to be responsive to 
a political climate of rising xenophobia, with austerity acting as a smokescreen 
for a more determinative anti-immigration discourse. By examining the available 
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data and adjudicating various moral arguments, I cast doubt on the claim that the 
current charging regulations are cost-effective and fair, and instead show that the 
government has deliberately and pragmatically produced a “hostile environment” 
for migrants, despite this very likely generating economic losses. I argue that it is 
critical to the future of the NHS that migrants are welcomed, both as staff and as 
patients.
This paper is structured as follows. In the first section, I describe recent changes 
to NHS care for migrants, which have been introduced as part of a broader pro-
gramme of “austerity.” In the second section, I show that fairness and frugality are 
the government’s stated objectives in charging migrants. The following sections 
examine some of the data around the costs and savings of the new regime to deter-
mine whether or not it is likely to be cost-effective, and then adjudicate a series of 
moral arguments that might be used to ground the charging of migrants, in order to 
determine whether or not the new system can be argued to be fair. I then propose 
moral arguments for extending free NHS care to all migrants and conclude by argu-
ing that xenophobia has been more determinative of the current charging regime 
than austerity.
This paper provides a novel perspective on the confluence of austerity discourse 
and xenophobia as they jointly contribute to the new restrictions around migrants’ 
access to the NHS. In addition, by evaluating a range of philosophical arguments for 
and against migrants’ inclusion as full “citizens” of the NHS, it contributes to the 
debate around migrants’ entitlements to welfare services more generally.
The Hostile Environment in the NHS
The global financial crisis of 2008 triggered the “Great Recession,” to which the UK 
government responded by heralding an “age of austerity” and implementing a deficit 
reduction programme [15]. Austerity is a fiscal strategy characterised by a reduction 
in the ratio of tax spending to tax revenue, achieved either by decreasing the former 
or raising the latter. Austerity measures in the UK have primarily focussed on reduc-
ing public spending rather than increasing tax income.
The UK government assured the public that austerity measures would not affect 
the NHS, a popular institution upon which most UK residents are reliant [76]. It was 
claimed that NHS funding would be ring-fenced while the deficit would be closed 
by making cuts to government spending elsewhere. This promise was not honoured, 
and funding to the NHS as a proportion of national spending has fallen over the last 
decade [42, 57]. The NHS budget is currently growing by just 3% each year, com-
pared with an average 4.1% growth rate since the 1950s [43]. Further, other welfare 
cuts and reforms have drastically affected the social determinants of health in ways 
that have increased the burden on the NHS, by e.g. exacerbating poverty, homeless-
ness, and unemployment [5, 65]. Over the same period, the NHS has been spending 
two to three billion pounds each year in hiring agency staff to address a rising num-
ber of vacancies, a situation which has been exacerbated by the effects of austerity 
on recruitment and retention [77].
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In at least one domain, the government has been candid and even forthright about 
its commitment to cutting NHS services. In an interview with The Telegraph in 
2012, then-home secretary Theresa May stated that in removing public services for 
migrants, “the aim is to create here in Britain a really hostile environment for illegal 
migration” [41]. Accordingly, a year later, her infamous “Go Home” billboard buses 
under “Operation Vaken” patrolled six London boroughs with sizeable immigrant 
populations, threatening undocumented migrants with arrest or “voluntary depor-
tation” [75]. Soon afterwards, the Immigration Act 2014 came into force, one of 
whose aims was “to limit […] access to services, facilities and employment by ref-
erence to immigration status” [35]. Amongst other changes, the Act restricted free 
NHS coverage to those who are “ordinarily resident,” requiring all those who could 
not prove they had been resident in the UK for five years to pay for their care. In 
2017, up-front charges were introduced with the aim of improving cost recovery, 
requiring chargeable NHS patients to pay for their care before receiving it [77]. Over 
the course of just a few years, access to the NHS for migrants has been drastically 
reduced, and the range of different entitlement categories has multiplied [64].
Some NHS services remain freely available to all: primary care; care given imme-
diately within an accident and emergency department; treatment for certain commu-
nicable diseases (e.g. HIV, TB, and STIs); palliative care; contraceptives; and care 
which attends to the physical and mental effects of violence [65].1 Beyond this basic 
care, the NHS is a four-tier system, which operates as follows:
 (i) Those who are ordinarily resident, refugees, or asylum-seekers, do not pay for 
their care;
 (ii) Visa-holders pay the “Immigration Health Surcharge” of £400 per year and 
may thereafter access NHS care without additional charge;
 (iii) Patients from states within the European Economic Area (EEA) pay an up-
front charge equalling the face-value cost of treatment;2
 (iv) Those from outside the EEA, including those yet to apply for asylum, those 
whose asylum-applications have been refused, those who have over-stayed 
their visas, and all undocumented migrants, pay an up-front charge equalling 
150% of the face-value cost of treatment [20].
 As these changes have been enforced by the Department of Health and Social Care, 
the NHS has found itself increasingly entangled with the Home Office, as part of 
the broader “hostile environment” strategy. Between January 2017 and May 2018, 
a memorandum of understanding required healthcare workers to share the names 
and addresses of undocumented migrants with the Home Office [36, 1]. While at the 
time of writing that memorandum has been suspended, if a non-EEA patient has a 
debt of £500 or greater within 2 months of receiving care, their data must be shared 
with the Home Office, where it may be used in the assessment of any current or 
1 Notably, pregnancy care, including abortion, is not included in the set of free services [67].
2 If the patient has a valid European Health Insurance Card, some services beyond the aforementioned 
basic care are also free [78].
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future applications for the right to remain in the UK [20]. It is also important to note 
that undocumented migrants [who fall into category (iv)], are often destitute and are 
forbidden from working in any formal sector [60].
These changes were introduced in 2014 in the midst of wider austerity measures, 
and, as I will show in the next section, are justified primarily in economic terms. 
They may therefore be categorised as part of the broader programme of austerity.
The Motivation for Austerity in Migrant Healthcare: Fairness 
and Frugality
The aim of this section is to show that fairness and frugality are the government’s 
stated objectives in charging migrants  for NHS care. These motivations can be 
inferred from policy documents and parliamentary debates from 2012 to the present.
In the previous section, austerity was defined as a set of measures intended to 
reduce the public-spend/public-revenue ratio. While the global financial crisis has 
been cited as the general motivation for austerity measures, the particular funding 
cuts that are made are typically justified in normative terms. These restrictive meas-
ures are presented as an economic necessity which, in a time of scarcity, reinstates 
fairness. Indeed, the welfare reforms undertaken under the austerity regime were 
described by the prime minister as a “moral mission” [63]. As a rule, all UK auster-
ity measures have been legitimated in this way, which seems to align with the values 
of the UK public [73].
The incentive for charging migrants for their care has always been articulated pri-
marily in economic terms. The Department of Health and Social Care states that:
At a time of increased financial challenge for the NHS, every organisation 
needs to ensure they are meeting their legal obligation and maximising the 
cost recovery potential [20].
 In the foreword to a 2013 government report, entitled “Controlling Immigration—
Regulating Migrant Access to Health Services in the UK,” Theresa May stated that 
“the current rules regulating migrant access to the NHS are too generous, particu-
larly when compared with wider international practice, poorly applied and act as a 
draw to health tourists” [48]. The report goes on to claim that “This level of gener-
osity has been the subject of ongoing public concern” [48].
In a written statement in the House of Commons in 2013, the motivation for 
charging was described as follows:
[P]ublic services like the NHS are under increasing strain, coping with the 
demands of an ageing population and financial pressures. The NHS is and 
will remain free at the point of delivery for its residents, but it cannot continue 
as an international rather than a national health service. We urgently need to 
address this or the system is likely to become unsustainable [45].
 In another government report, tellingly entitled “Making a fair contribution,” it is 
claimed that charging migrants for their healthcare is “one way we can ensure the 
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NHS is sustainable for us all in years to come” [18]. Later on, the concern about the 
NHS being “financially sustainable” is reiterated. In 2014, then-Secretary of State 
for Health Jeremy Hunt described the restrictions in similar terms:
The Department of Health is working to create a fairer NHS by improving the 
systems for charging overseas visitors and migrants to make sure they contrib-
ute towards their NHS health care. It is clear that more can be done to increase 
cost recovery [82].
 Again, financial sustainability is a key stated driver of the new charging regime, 
with Hunt going on in the same debate to emphasise healthcare providers’ “statu-
tory obligation to support NHS sustainability through appropriate identification and 
charging of visitors and migrants.”
Similarly, three years later then-Minister of State for Health Philip Dunne claimed 
that the changes:
aimed to support the principle of fairness by ensuring those not resident in the 
United Kingdom pay for NHS care. The proposals would not restrict access, 
but rather make sure that everyone makes a fair contribution towards the cost 
of the care they receive [50].
 In relation to entitlement to a public service, fairness and frugality are obviously 
linked. Resources are finite, and generally scarce, particularly during times of aus-
terity. Later in the article, I explore various notions of fairness, but regardless of 
one’s definition, in order for a scarce resource to be allocated in a way that is fair, 
it presumably must be used as efficiently as possible, since waste and excess detract 
from the budget available for providing for the needs of service-users. Therefore, 
fairness in relation to public services requires considerations of frugality. And fru-
gality in an already streamlined system generally means removing access to some 
services, which requires normative judgments to be made.
The justifiability of the new charging regime3 therefore depends on the veracity 
of two claims: that restricting migrants’ access to the NHS (a) saves money, and (b) 
makes the service fairer. In the next two sections I examine whether these objectives 
are being met.
Is It Cost Effective to Charge Migrants for Their Healthcare?
In this section, I examine some of the data around the costs and savings of the new 
regime in order to identify any divergence between the government’s claims and the 
operative reality, and thereby test the claim of cost-effectiveness.
At its highest estimate, the cost of deliberate health tourism is around 0.3% of the 
annual NHS budget, amounting to around 300 million pounds [34]. Moreover, the 
UK is a net-exporter of medical tourists, with more UK citizens seeking treatment 
3 It may be that welfare cuts are never justifiable, even in times of economic recession, but that takes us 
beyond the scope of this paper.
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abroad than health tourists to the UK [32]. Under the current charging regime, the 
government intends to recover 500 million pounds per year through charging for 
NHS services via up-front payments from “overseas visitors” and immigration 
health surcharges from visa-holders [17], but a National Audit Office report sug-
gests that 346 million pounds per year is a more realistic aim [51]. Even at this lower 
estimate, available data casts doubt on the prospect of cost recovery outweighing 
the cost of administrating the new system. A 2017 pilot scheme found that of 8900 
patients who were identified for upfront charging, only 50 patients were charged for 
their care [46], and in 2016, a hospital in Hampshire spent £231,000 funding an 
“overseas visitor management team” [24], yet recovered just £50,000 from charge-
able patients [25]. It seems doubtful that the new up-front charging regime could 
produce the almost fivefold increase in cost recovery required to offset the bureau-
cratic costs. Further, the government has admitted that its assessment of cost recov-
ery makes “broad assumptions” based on data that is “incomplete or inconsistent” 
[16] and that it does not have a firm sense of the number of people who are charge-
able [85]. All this seems to dispute the idea that charging migrants is motivated by 
fiscal considerations. While one might argue that failures to accurately estimate the 
costs of charging migrants could point to government incompetence rather than any 
pernicious intention, there are moral questions to be asked about a government that 
introduces a policy which effectively removes healthcare from a vulnerable group 
without first ensuring that there will be greater overall benefits, and which then fails 
to overturn the policy when it becomes evident that the costing was not rigorous, 
and that considerable moral and financial costs are incurred elsewhere.
Half of all doctors joining the NHS workforce in 2018 were trained outside the 
UK [27], a figure which is not unusual in a health service that has always been 
dependent on its migrant workforce [70]. Yet the same “hostile environment” that 
restricts migrants’ access to the NHS also affects the ability of the NHS to hire 
workers from abroad. In 2008, just as the global financial crisis was unfolding, the 
government announced the “points-based immigration system” whose aim was to 
reduce the number of immigrants to the UK.4 An immigration cap followed in 2010, 
limiting the number of non-EU migrants to 24,100 per year [69]. This has affected 
the ability of the NHS to reach safe staffing levels. In 2015, the NHS Employers 
Organisation estimated that around 1000 applications from non-EU nurses were 
refused due to caps on visas for non-EU workers [84], and in 2018, the General 
Medical Council (GMC) announced that at least 400 doctors were unable to take up 
positions in the UK [26]. Many others will have been deterred from applying due to 
visa restrictions.
An exemption to the cap was implemented for nurses and doctors in 2018 under 
pressure from medical professional bodies, but at the time of writing, the NHS has 
103,000 vacancies [52]. Not only do these vacancies threaten the quality of NHS 
care, but the temporary agency staff employed to maintain safe staffing levels are 
considerably more expensive than salaried staff. Between 2014 and 2015, the NHS 
4 That the point-based system was introduced in order to reduce immigration in response to public pres-
sure may be witnessed within parliamentary debates on the matter, e.g. [62].
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spent more than three billion pounds on agency costs [53], which led to the intro-
duction of caps on the pay of agency workers. Even so, it is estimated that the NHS 
spent 2.4 billion on agency nursing staff alone in 2018, equivalent to the cost of 
employing an additional 66,000 nurses, almost twice as many as are needed to fill 
existing vacancies [77]. It is important to note that the dearth of NHS nurses has 
been exacerbated by other health-related austerity measures which have affected 
recruitment and retention. More than half of nurses report negative effects on the 
profession following funding cuts, a quarter are unable to access training opportuni-
ties due to reduced training budgets, and two-fifths have been impacted by public 
sector pay caps. Following the removal of bursaries for student nurses in 2017, the 
number of applications for nursing degrees has fallen by a third [75].
Another factor to consider is the cost to the state of excluding or deterring 
migrants from using the NHS. Research undertaken in Germany shows that it is 
more costly to exclude migrants from healthcare services than to extend the full raft 
of services to all [7]. The confusion that has arisen in the UK around charging regu-
lations and Home Office involvement means that many migrants avoid healthcare 
services altogether, even those to which they are entitled, or that they may wait until 
their medical problems progress into emergencies, leading to worse health outcomes 
and greater cost [13, 60]. Emergency care is much more expensive than planned 
care, and the risk of dangerous and expensive disease outbreaks is also increased 
[38]. Further, the checks involved in establishing the eligibility for care can lead 
to delays in diagnosis and treatment which ultimately cost the service more. The 
government has not factored into their calculations the costs that are likely to be 
incurred as chargeable patients’ use of accident and emergency services rises, either 
as untreated ailments escalate, or as people seek treatment in the areas of the NHS 
that remain free to all [85].
Is It Fair to Charge Migrants for Their Healthcare?
The government claims that charging those who are not ordinarily resident for their 
healthcare is fair, but the moral basis for that assertion is never spelled out. In this 
section, I outline and adjudicate the various notions of fairness that might be used to 
justify this claim.
Based on the documents cited earlier in this article, the government’s notion of 
fairness is likely arbitrated according to the following principle: only those who 
contribute to the health service should be permitted to benefit from it. This is a 
principle that may seem especially urgent in times of austerity. The NHS is funded 
through general taxation, therefore a “fair” system might exclude all those who do 
not pay taxes, and include all those who do. Yet applying such a scheme consist-
ently would mean that all visa-holding migrant workers would have free care, while 
many non-tax-payers who are ordinarily resident would not. As it stands, those who 
are ordinarily resident are afforded free care regardless of tax contributions, while 
those who are not must pay regardless of their tax contributions. Although those 
who are ordinarily resident are usually related to others who have paid taxes, and 
might accordingly be afforded access to the NHS, the same argument can be adapted 
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to include migrants. Given that large numbers of health-workers from Global South 
nations have come to work within the NHS, having had their training funded in part 
by the taxpayers of their own states, and then having contributed to the NHS through 
taxation, by the same reasoning they and their relatives could surely claim some 
right to free access.5
Similarly, since taxpayers’ earnings fund the NHS, fairness might be taken to 
require that those contributions be directed solely or largely towards the interests 
of taxpayers, i.e. towards their health and that of their dependents and relatives. 
Extending free healthcare to non-contributors may be seen as an unfair use of tax-
payers’ contributions, in that the cost (in both time and money) of non-contributors’ 
care diverts resources away from taxpayers’ healthcare. Yet as we have seen, the cost 
of charging non-contributors for their care exceeds the costs recovered.
Another way of adjudicating fairness might be to consider the net contribution of 
migrants to the UK economy as a whole. A strong economy enables a well-funded 
NHS. One might reason that provided migrants can be shown to have made a net 
contribution to the economy, including over periods in which they have been entitled 
to free NHS care, then it is only fair that they be permitted to use the NHS for free. 
A recent study shows that immigrants arriving in the UK between 2000 and 2011, 
a period during which most migrants would have been able to use the NHS without 
charge, made a positive contribution to the UK economy of around £25 billion. The 
cost recovery target of £500 million pales in contrast to this sum, and the figure is 
yet more striking when one considers that “native” residents made a negative contri-
bution of £617 billion [21].
These first three notions of fairness have at their root the “free-rider” problem, 
according to which it is morally troubling for those who do not contribute to a ser-
vice to benefit from the contributions of others [33]. However, it is not clear whether 
the free-rider problem applies to healthcare as easily as it might apply to other 
goods. Denying healthcare to some in order to prevent free-riding is self-defeating if 
it interferes with the ability of others to maintain good health. Consider that if some 
people were forbidden  or deterred from receiving vaccinations, or treatments for 
infectious diseases, they and others may be put at risk. Further, it is misleading to 
refer to migrants as “free-riders” when current employment laws forbid them from 
working, or force them to work illegitimately in the non-taxable informal economy, 
thereby preventing them from contributing.
One might be concerned with fairness particularly in relation to undocumented 
migrants’ access to the NHS. Their residence within the UK is unlawful, therefore 
one might argue that it is not fair to furnish them with services that facilitate their 
unlawful residence. Just as those in prison are denied certain rights, so too might it 
be argued that undocumented migrants, qua criminals, ought to be denied particu-
lar services. Yet even if one believes that a punitive approach is apposite, it is not 
5 One can take this further: given that many workers across all sectors have migrated to the UK and 
contributed to the economy, surely their relatives ought also to be afforded access. One might also wish 
to factor in the contributions of those (descended from) workers within former British colonies who have 
contributed to the wealth that the NHS now draws upon. I return to this issue in the next section.
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clear that denying healthcare to a person is an appropriate or proportionate response. 
After all, even prisoners have access to healthcare. Nor has it been shown that barri-
ers to healthcare reduce the number of undocumented migrants. A 2015 report con-
ducted by Doctors of the World reports that migrants using their clinics waited an 
average 6.5 years before their first contact with a healthcare service, largely because 
of fears about arrest and deportation [13].
A related concern is that if everyone is permitted to use the NHS, then greater 
numbers of migrants will be drawn to the UK, threatening its sustainability. Yet the 
predicted effect, termed the “welfare magnet hypothesis” has no firm evidence base: 
migration decisions are not made on the basis of the generosity of welfare entitle-
ments, and across Europe, migrants underuse welfare entitlements despite greater 
levels of deprivation [29]. In the UK, migrants underuse the health services to 
which they are entitled [74], despite having more demanding physical and mental 
health needs [49]. Accordingly, reducing entitlements is likely to limit the health of 
migrants, rather than their numbers.
Changing tack, one might argue that the notion of fairness being drawn upon here 
relates not to contributions, but simply to citizenship. One might see NHS care as 
a benefit of British citizenship, i.e.  the UK government has a duty to cater for the 
(health) needs of UK citizens, regardless of their contributions. In turn, UK citizens 
accept the constraints and duties of citizenship, including (for most) the requirement 
that they contribute to the NHS. Yet this argument rests on a misrepresentation. 
NHS services are free to those who are ordinarily resident within the UK, which 
excludes British citizens who are resident abroad and includes non-citizens living in 
the UK long-term [54]. Residence within the jurisdiction is the critical criterion, not 
citizenship, which makes it difficult to justify excluding undocumented migrants.6 
Even glossing this, another difficulty arises. Allowing members (whether citizens 
or residents) access to free NHS services, while excluding non-members, proves 
difficult to ground without circularity. As Cole points out, membership is defined 
through its associated benefits, which begs the question of how that membership 
is initially justified [14]. Any attempt to ground the difference via the claim that 
members have contributed to welfare, while non-members have not, is undermined 
by the fact that membership is also defined by its associated duties i.e. contribution. 
Non-contributors cannot contribute; non-contributors cannot access healthcare. Fur-
ther, instead claiming that non-members must be instrumentally excluded in order 
to protect the rights of members is similarly circular: how does one justify refusing 
to meet the needs of one group to protect the needs of another, i.e. what is the moral 
basis for determining which people will count as “insiders” and “outsiders”?
Section two closed by noting that the justifiability of the new charging regime 
depends on the veracity of two claims: that restricting migrants’ access to the NHS 
(a) saves money, and (b) makes the service fairer. The evidence and arguments pro-
vided within this section and the previous one cast doubt on both (a) and (b).
6 Hundreds of thousands of whom have been living in the UK long enough to qualify for regularisation 
[30].
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In Search of Fairness and Frugality
Fairness and frugality are understandable ambitions within a publicly-funded health 
service. Scarce essential goods must be distributed with sensitivity to moral con-
siderations. This section addresses the challenge of upholding these values while 
maintaining moral legitimacy with respect to migrants’ relationship to the health-
care service.
So far, I have shown that charging migrants for their care is likely to cost more 
money than it saves and that there is no obvious notion of fairness which can con-
sistently ground the exclusion of migrants from free NHS care. One could argue 
that, in the absence of any consistent moral or financial grounds for charging 
migrants, their NHS care should be free. This argument can be strengthened if posi-
tive grounds can also be given. Further, the conceptions of fairness adjudicated in 
the last section were primarily economic (i.e. utilitarian) in nature, since the gov-
ernment frames its decisions that way, yet even if it were the case that charging 
migrants was cost-effective, there would still be non-utilitarian moral arguments to 
consider. In this section I briefly consider some arguments in favour of free NHS 
care for all, regardless of nationality or immigration status.
One obvious way to conceive of fairness within a health service which is used 
and staffed by migrants, against the backdrop of a globalised world, is moral cosmo-
politanism. Moral cosmopolitanism demands that moral consideration be oblivious 
to state borders; every person must be factored into moral calculations, regardless 
of nationality [9]. Applying this to the matter at hand, two moral statements can be 
generated: we must not deny healthcare to a person based on nationality; we must 
not deny NHS roles to healthcare workers based on nationality. Elsewhere, I have 
argued that the first of these principles is being violated in the NHS while the sec-
ond is being upheld (even if not for these reasons) [66]. Accordingly, the NHS real-
ises a partial moral cosmopolitanism in its interactions with migrants, or, less chari-
tably but more accurately, the NHS inconsistently applies moral cosmopolitanism. 
Since it is not realistic or morally acceptable to restrict the freedom of movement 
of migrant healthcare workers, I recommend that a more consistent moral cosmo-
politanism be attained by allowing all patients free access to the NHS, regardless 
of their nationality. In other words, the NHS is not currently fair, but could be made 
fairer by removing any restriction based on residence or nationality.
A similar conclusion can be reached via utilitarian considerations. One could 
argue that a publicly-funded health service has a duty to taxpayers to provide opti-
mal value for money. Accordingly, it should minimise any non-essential costs. First, 
employing migrant workers within the NHS is currently the most economical way 
of running the service,7 since: the UK struggles to train and retain sufficient num-
bers of healthcare workers; the training costs of migrant workers has been met else-
where; any staffing shortfall requires locum staff to be paid at higher rates. Second, 
the available evidence seems to indicate that the bureaucracy required to charge 
7 This raises moral issues of its own, but I set those aside here in order to maintain the focus of this 
paper. See e.g. [31, 66].
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migrants for NHS treatment outweighs the costs that can be recovered. Third, if 
migrant patients are deterred from seeking care, larger costs may be incurred later as 
patients develop complications. Ensuring that the NHS is free for all seems to be the 
most frugal way of running the service, which is thereby the fairest use of taxpayers’ 
contributions.
Two separate incidents involving migrant nurses from Kenya highlighted the 
absurdity of the current “partial cosmopolitanism.” As visa-holders, they were 
required to pay the immigration health surcharge for themselves and their depend-
ents for each year of their 5-year visas. For a family of four, this would currently 
amount to a payment of £8000. Unable to raise the required sum, one nurse sent two 
children back to Kenya [55], while another left two children behind in the care of 
relatives [44]. These nurses, who had trained and qualified in Kenya, either having 
sponsored themselves or having received state-sponsorship [40], had been employed 
to help address staff shortages within the UK’s largely free healthcare system, yet 
were unable to access free healthcare for themselves and their families. It is hard to 
imagine a conception of fairness that this situation does not violate.
Another way of grounding the UK’s responsibilities towards migrants is to con-
sider the causal role that the UK has played in the production of the events (e.g. war, 
regime change, economic crisis) which have led to large numbers of migrants seek-
ing new lives in Europe [8]. The top five nationalities of asylum-seekers and undoc-
umented migrants to the UK are Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, Bangladesh, and Sudan [79]. 
All have been strongly affected by British imperialism, and have since been char-
acterised by one or more of widespread poverty, repressive governance, or military 
intervention, which are predictable consequences of colonialism [10, 47, 81]. This 
causal connection can be used to argue that the UK has “reparative responsibilities” 
to make amends for past actions which still affect many people today [47], or “asso-
ciative duties” to share the economic benefits gleaned through previous associative 
ties of colonialism [86]. One straightforward way to begin to meet these responsi-
bilities would be to extend welfare rights, such as free healthcare, to migrants from 
affected regions. This analysis could be broadened to cover migrants from all Global 
South states by noting that current global financial institutions, designed and main-
tained by the interests of wealthy Global North nations, perpetuate Global South 
poverty [61]. Accordingly, welfare entitlements such as free NHS care could be 
extended to Global South migrants as a step towards realising international distribu-
tive justice [3].
Finally, there are important medical ethics concerns to consider.8 Under the 
new regime, patients are entitled to free primary care and emergency care, but are 
charged for any care resulting from a referral from either of these services. While 
much of the bureaucracy of charging for treatment is managed within dedicated 
finance departments, doctors must recommend chargeable treatments where they are 
medically indicated, and in the same breath inform patients of their chargeability, in 
order to provide optimal information with respect to treatment decisions. Yet this 
8 See e.g. [8, 67, 87] for additional arguments from medical ethics.
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transforms the doctor–patient encounter so that financial considerations become a 
central, and often determinative, aspect of medical decision-making, and healthcare 
workers face substantial new moral burdens, plausibly leading to considerable moral 
distress [2, 23, 67]. Consider the difficulty of referring a patient for cancer treatment 
or maternity care and having the patient refuse the referral due to concerns about 
costs or immigration status [68]. While many other health systems have always oper-
ated on this basis, to introduce a two-tier system and its concomitant moral burdens 
into a system whose workers did not train with the expectation of that additional 
moral labour raises serious concerns. One could therefore argue that in order for 
medical professionals to meet their professional ethical duties, comprehensive free 
NHS care should be available to all.9
Conclusion: Austerity and Xenophobia
In this paper I have demonstrated that migrants’ reduced access to NHS services 
does not achieve the fairness and frugality that are ostensibly sought, because it very 
likely costs more to administrate such a system that can be earned from it. Further, 
related anti-immigration policies endanger the supply of migrant labour upon which 
the NHS relies in order to provide care inexpensively. On the question of fairness, I 
have adjudicated various moral grounds for denying free healthcare to migrants, and 
have  found that they lead to inconsistencies. Further, I have offered arguments in 
favour of extending free healthcare to migrants.
If charging “overseas visitors” for their care cannot reasonably be claimed to be 
impelled by fairness and frugality, what are the likely motivations? To answer this 
question, one must confront the fact that xenophobic attitudes in the UK are some of 
the strongest in Europe, and have been emboldened by the recent Brexit referendum, 
as well as being a major driver of its result [83]. Opposition to immigration is com-
mon across all regions, ages, and political allegiances, and is strongly determined by 
fears about threats to British culture and national identity, concerns about welfare 
use, and racial prejudice [4, 22]. In June 2016, just ahead of the referendum, 48% of 
those surveyed saw immigration or immigrants as the most important issue facing 
Britain, and the NHS as the second most important issue [37]. Not only is xeno-
phobia widespread, but racism is a strong element, with the UK public preferring 
Western European and Australian immigration, followed by Eastern European, and 
then West Indian and Indian or Pakistani immigration—in other words, preferences 
for immigrants tracks racialisation, with white immigrants favoured [4].
Within political discourse, immigration and austerity have a complicated interde-
pendent relationship. Even though austerity policies were ostensibly a response to 
a global financial downturn, in the UK they have tended to target particular groups, 
who are represented as making illegitimate, underhand claims on the nation’s 
9 This position can also be motivated via virtue ethics, in considering the virtues that underwrite the role 
of a medical professional [58].
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financial resources. This narrative is so compelling to many that immigration is lia-
ble to be blamed for the poverty and inequality caused by austerity measures [19]. 
Austerity is used as an excuse to implement further restrictions on immigration and 
on migrants’ access to services alongside broader fiscal cuts, the ensuing scarcity 
is then often attributed to immigration, which seems to recommend further restric-
tions on immigration and migrants. A similar story can be told in relation to welfare 
claimants. In making and announcing targeted cuts, the government constructs and 
highlights the moral transgressions of these “undeserving” groups in such a way as 
to render them likely scapegoats for the negative effects of broader austerity meas-
ures. Burnett describes the two “folk-devils that have been elevated to the forefront 
of narratives of austerity: the migrant and the home-grown ‘scrounger’” [11]. This 
is an incisive summary of the government’s strategy, according to which the with-
drawal of resources from groups that were in any case “undeserving” furnishes its 
own moral legitimacy. A corollary of this interdependence is that austerity regimes 
are exacerbating racism [71], and there seems to be evidence for this across Europe 
[56].
The current political climate  in the UK compels the government to prioritise 
decisions which demonstrate its hostility to migrants regardless of the economic 
costs. It is telling that the current charging regime does not appear to have been 
rigorously costed [16, 17, 51, 85]. To fail to carefully cost a new policy in a time of 
austerity is unthinkable unless either the potential political reward outweighs any 
economic cost, or policy-makers have themselves been persuaded by folk wisdom 
about migrants being a drain on the economy. Either case has xenophobia at its root. 
Any politician or political party that attempts to explain the value of immigration, 
either morally or economically, is liable to be undercut by the realpolitik of a rival 
who has the advantage of a pre-existing discourse of fear and hatred. For those trad-
ing in xenophobia, the NHS is an astute choice. As one commentator put it: “the 
NHS is almost a religion in the UK; its “overstretching”—especially by foreigners—
presented as a blasphemy” [28].
In October 2018, the Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond announced 
that the “era of austerity” was “finally coming to an end” but at the same time set 
out a budget for the year head which entails a £1 billion cut to health spending [80]. 
Meanwhile, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human 
rights has issued a damning condemnation of the effects of austerity on the most 
vulnerable [6], and has described the plight of asylum seekers and migrants in the 
UK in strong terms:
Destitution is built into the asylum system. Asylum seekers are banned from 
working and limited to a derisory level of support that guarantees they will 
live in poverty. The government promotes work as the solution to poverty, 
yet refuses to allow this particular group to work. […] For those who have no 
recourse to public funds as a result of their immigration status, the situation 
can be particularly difficult [59].
The full extent of the concomitant health consequences is not yet known, but the 
government’s failure to release reports of the effects of charging on migrants’ health 
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has led to concern amongst medical professional bodies, and accusations of suppres-
sion [12].
In summary, the xenophobia that has been constructed within the UK is more 
likely to cost the NHS in the long run, since excluding migrants produces substantial 
additional bureaucratic costs and costly medical complications, while the employ-
ment of much-needed migrant workers is obstructed. This is aside from the seri-
ous moral cost of failing to provide for the health needs of migrant patients. Read-
ers may be reminded of another high price the UK is paying for currying political 
favour via the espousal and entrenchment of xenophobic discourses. As I write, the 
cost of leaving the EU as a result of the 2016 Brexit referendum stands at £26 billion 
per year even prior to the economic losses which will be incurred as a result of leav-
ing the EU Customs Union trade bloc [72]. It is unsurprising that rousing xenopho-
bia in a globalised world will incur economic (not to mention moral) costs, yet this 
is evidently considered to be worth the convenience of a credible political scapegoat 
in a nation in which racism has such robust currency [39].
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